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Ethical Problems in Class Arbitration
Andrew Powell* and Richard A. Bales**
I. INTRODUCTION
Many types of agreements contain arbitration clauses.' With the growing
trend favoring arbitration in disputes, 2 a newer fashion of arbitration formed -
class arbitration.3 While class arbitration is widely popular and has been exercised
in multiple disputes over the last eight years, the Supreme Court of the United
States recently restricted the availability of class arbitration claims in AT&T Mo-
bility v. Concepcion.4 In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion, there
is a strong possibility that Congress will amend the Federal Arbitration Act to
nullify the holding.5 Regardless of whether the Supreme Court came to the correct
conclusion in Concepcion, the holding presents the perfect opportunity for Con-
gress to also address the ethical issues in class arbitration.6
This article examines two significant conflicts of interest that arise in class
arbitration7 in six parts. Part II provides background on the recent evolution of
class arbitration, explaining how the Supreme Court had decided several cases
involving class arbitration but has not explicitly ruled that class actions are either
permitted or forbidden.8 Meanwhile, class-action cases continued to be arbitrated
- at least until Concepcion - without consideration of the ethical issues discussed
in this article. Parts IT and IV describe the conflicts of interest in detail, provide
illustrative examples, and contrasts the lack of protection for absent members in
class arbitration with the protection for absent class members in class-action liti-
gation provided by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23).9
Part 11 discusses the conflicts of interest that could arise at the beginning of
class arbitration. In class arbitration, the arbitrator selects lead counsel to represent
* Andrew M. Powell is an associate at the Henderson, Kentucky firm of Neel, Wilson &
Clem. He received his J.D. from Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University
and his B.A. from the University of Louisville.
** Richard Bales is a Professor of Law and Director, NKU Center for Excellence in Advocacy, at
Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
1. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding a shrink wrap
arbitration clause found inside the box of a new computer valid); see also National Basketball Players
Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXI, http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/
ARTICLE%20XXXI.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2011)(17 page section in the CBA establishing arbitra-
tion procedures for disputes arising from the CBA).
2. See id.
3. Class arbitration was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court beginning in 2003.
See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,455 (2003).
4. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
5. Over 25 briefs were filed in Concepcion. Seven states and the District of Columbia all filed
amicus briefs in support of the consumers.
6. See Thomas A. Doyle, Protecting Nonparty Class Members in Class Arbitrations, 25 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 25 (2009).
7. Id.
8. See discussion infra Part fl.
9. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
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the class as a whole,10 just as a judge would in traditional class-action litigation."
Whereas Rule 23 sets criteria for judges to selecting class counsel in litigation,
arbitrators are not bound by the Rule 23 criteria for selecting class counsel. There-
fore, there is no standard to keep arbitrators neutral and their counsel selection
decisions unbiased from financial and social influence. An attorney's selection
and payment of fees to an arbitrator, followed almost immediately by the arbitra-
tor's selection of that attorney as lead counsel, creates a strong appearance of par-
tiality.
Part IV discusses conflicts of interest that arise at the end of class arbitration.
In class arbitration, the arbitrator must make an award or approve a settlement
between the parties and ensure that the counsel adequately represents the class as
a wholel 2 -again, just as a judge would in class-action litigation.' 3 In class arbi-
tration, however, the arbitrator is initially selected by class counsel, and likely has
been receiving payment for his or her services since the onset of the proceedings.
This creates a strong financial incentive for the arbitrator to be more concerned
with the interests of class counsel than with the interests of absent class members.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that arbitrators, unlike judges, are not
bound by Rule 23's criteria for scrutinizing settlements to ensure that absent class
members receive a fair deal. Additionally, there is little chance that misconduct on
the part of the arbitrator will ever be discovered in light of the fact that judicial
review of arbitration awards is extremely limited.
Part V of this article argues that if and when Congress amends the Federal
Arbitration Act to statutorily permit class arbitration in light of Concepcion, a
fully developed statute should be enacted to permit limited judicial supervision of
the process of selecting class arbitrators and the process of issuing a class award
or approving a class settlement.14 Doing so will allow Congress to eliminate the
conflicts of interest while retaining the benefits of class arbitration. Part VI con-
cludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Class arbitration is a relatively new field in the world of alternative dispute
resolution. 15 It is a mix of two efficiency mechanisms in dispute resolution-class
actions that allow the joining of multiple parties who have suffered similar injuries
(usually by the same defendant) in a financially feasible fashion;' 6 and arbitration,
which offers binding results and a plethora of advantages over litigation.'7
Some advantages of arbitration over conventional litigation include
the accelerated nature of arbitration proceedings, lowered expenses, the relaxation
10. See discussion infra Part ILI.B.2.
I1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2).
12. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
14. See discussion infra Part V.
15. The American Arbitration Association did not formally recognize class arbitration until 2003.
See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (Oct. 8, 2003),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936.
16. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
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of the evidentiary rules and discovery, the confidentiality of the proceeding over a
public hearing, the opportunity to have arbitrators who have subject matter exper-
tise over the issue, the less adversarial nature, and fewer formalities. While com-
plex class arbitration proceedings can lead to greater fees required by both parties
to pay to the arbitrator(s), these fees are offset by the numerosity of the class
yielding much greater benefit than an arbitration proceeding brought by a single
claimant over the same issue.' 9 The following examines the origination of class
arbitration to give an essential background into its unique qualities that have been
controversial from the beginning.
No provisions in either the Federal Arbitration Act or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure specifically refer to class arbitration. Over the last decade, as
arbitral class actions have become increasingly common, the Supreme Court had
decided several cases involving class arbitration. In any of those cases, the Court
could have ruled that this absence of a legal foundation makes class arbitration
impermissible. The Court has not done so; nor has it ruled explicitly that class
arbitration is permissible. Instead, the Court has decided these cases on other
grounds. Meanwhile, class-action cases continued to be arbitrated - at least until
the Court held earlier this year in Concepcion that class-action waivers in arbitra-
tion agreements are enforceable - without consideration of the ethical issues dis-
cussed in this article.
A. Federal Arbitration Act
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925.20 The purpose
of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements in "contract[s]
evidencing a transaction involving commerce."21 After a few revisions and up-
dates, the FAA became the federal backbone for enforcing commercial arbitration
proceedings in the United States.22 Congress desired to put arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong." 23 The FAA pro-
vides a framework for when arbitrations should occur and how arbitrations should
be conducted.24 Nevertheless, the FAA is silent on whether class arbitrations are
allowed or disallowed in disputes.25 Also, the FAA neither speaks about the vi-
ability of class arbitrations nor provides guidelines for class arbitration.
26
18. Id. See also AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, A GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION FOR
BUsINESS PEOPLE 4 (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4121; see also David S. Clancy
& Matthew M. K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act's
Legislative History, 63 Bus. LAW. 55, 73-74 (2007).
19. STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 488.
20. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2011).
21. Jon 0. Shimabukuro, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Aug. 15, 2003), available at
http://digital.library.unt.edulark:/67531/metacrs3879/ml/l/high-resd/RL30934.2003Augl 5.pdf
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011)).
22. See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2011).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 (1924).
24. See 9 U.S.C. § 2-13 (2011).
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B. Green Tree Finance Corp. v. Bazzle
Prior to 2003, there were no statutory provisions for or against class arbitra-
tion. That year, however, the United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized
class arbitration in Green Tree Finance Corp. v. Bazzle, implicitly recognized
class arbitration in 2003.27 Lynn and Burt Bazzle, along with over 3,700 individu-
als, took out loans for various purposes from the Green Tree Finance Corporation
in South Carolina.28 Green Tree failed to provide proper documentation regarding
borrowers' rights according to South Carolina law.29 The Bazzles sued filed a
claim and subsequently asked the trial court to certify their claims as a class action
moved for class certification. 30 Green Tree, in response, moved for the court to
compel arbitration. 31 The trial court did both: the court consolidated the claims as
a class action and entered an order compelling arbitration. 32 The parties then se-
lected an arbitrator and the arbitration proceeding ended with the awarding of
nearly eleven million dollars in statutory damages to the class.33 The trial court
affirmed the award and Green Tree appealed to the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals. 34 The Supreme Court of South Carolina withdrew the case from the Court
of Appeals and assumed jurisdiction.3 5 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
found that the contracts were silent in respect to class arbitration and consequently
authorized, although by omission, class arbitration, and that the arbitration prop-
erly proceeded in class form. 36
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
holding of the Supreme Court of South Carolina was consistent with the Federal
Arbitration Act.37 The issue of the case was the interpretation of the arbitration
clauses found in Green Tree's lending agreements, and whether the contracts al-
lowed class arbitration claims against the lender.38 The opinion found that the
appropriateness of class arbitration is an issue for the arbitrator to decide, and
should be determined according to the terms of the arbitration agreement found in
the lending contract, the appropriateness of class arbitration was an issue for the
arbitrator to decide.3 9 Therefore, the court reversed the ruling of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, and remanded the case to arbitration for an arbitrator to
27. Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 453-54.
28. Id. at 448; see also Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002); Brief of Peti-
tioner-Appelant at *3, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02-634).
29. Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 448.





35. Green Tree, 539 U,S. at 450. The Supreme Court at that time consolidated a factually similar
case against Green Tree to review both concurrently. See also Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498
S.E.2d 898 (S.C. 1998).
36. Id.
37. Id.; See also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2011).
38. Green Tree, 539 U,S. at 450 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Breyer delivered the controlling opinion of the Court, but the Justices were unable to provide a major-
ity opinion.
39. Id. at 454.
312 [Vol. 2011
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interpret the arbitration clause in the lending agreement and the appropriateness of
class arbitration. 0
The Court's narrow decision giving an arbitrator the power to decide whether
an arbitration clause in a contract forbids class arbitration, was weakened in that
only a controlling opinion and not a majority opinion of authoritative precedent
was delivered.4 The impact of Bazzle left the future of class action arbitration
unclear. By not holding outright that class arbitration is incompatible with the
FAA, the plurality opinion it seems implicitly the assumption that the FAA disfa-
vors class arbitration, which has led to numerous class arbitration filings.42
C. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp.
In Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., the Supreme Court of the United
States held that neither arbitrators nor courts could compel arbitration on a class
basis if the arbitration clause is silent in regards to the authorization of class arbi-
tration.4 3 Stolt-Nielsen involved several companies accusing their marine shipping
partners of fixing the prices for shipping their liquid goods." The parties submit-
ted the case to arbitration and left to the arbitrators the decision whether to certify
class proceedings. 45 Upon submitting the case to the arbitrators, the parties stipu-
lated that the agreement was silent on the issue of class certification, and the par-
ties had not reached an agreement on the matter.46 The arbitration panel certified
the class, but stayed the proceeding to allow the parties to issue a stay of the pro-
ceedings so that the parties could seek judicial review of the certification.47 The
District Court reversed the finding of the arbitration panel, and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and reinstated the arbitrators' class
certification.48
In the majority opinion, Justice Alito declined to discuss the rationale of the
lower courts and instead focused on what he felt was a correct class certification
based upon a justified and sound public policy in light of Bazzle. Rather than dis-
cussing the rationale of the lower courts, Justice Alito, in the majority opinion,
noted the arbitrators' class certification was based upon and justified as being
sound public policy following Green Tree.49 The majority opinion, however, ques-
tioned whether the arbitration panel's public policy justification was appropriate
as a default rule under the FAA, and whether the panel's decision conflicted with
the long-standing view that arbitration is a matter of consent.50 Justice Alito
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. STONE & BALES, supra note 19 at 488; See also Kristian v. Comeast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.
2006).
43. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). For further discussion, see Diana Link & Richard A. Bales, Waiving
Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements after Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds
International, PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 275 (2011).
44. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764-65.
45. Id. at 1766.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1768-69.
49. Id.
50. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769.
No. 2]1 313
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stated, "While the interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a matter
of state law . . . , the FAA imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, in-
cluding the basic precept that arbitration 'is a matter of consent, not coercion.'"-5
The Court found the primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of
private agreements according to their terms.52 The Court concluded, "a party may
not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."53 Given that the
parties had stipulated that there was no such agreement as to class arbitration, a
party could not coerce the other party into class arbitration. 54
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argued that overview by the Court at that time
would be improper as the case was not yet ripe.55 The parties had submitted to the
selected arbitrators, the decision as to whether the agreement allowed for arbitra-
56tion. Just as the Second Circuit had stated, the parties also submitted the deci-
sions as to the whether their arbitration clause allowed for class arbitration, and
the arbitrators did not overstep their authority in deciding, regardless as to which
way they went.57 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the majority opinion acknowl-
edged that the parties were sophisticated business entities58 which created major
issue Justice Ginsburg's dissent emphasized that this new rule left unanswered
questions as to whether this type of "affirmative-authorization" requirement ap-
plies to contracts of adhesion, such as a form contract, which are offered on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis.59 With the recognition of class arbitration by the Su-
preme Court, new conflicts and ethical issues arise for the arbitrators who take
on class arbitration hearings.61
In light of Stolt-Nielsen, has the Supreme Court effectively crushed class arbi-
tration if the arbitration clause is silent as to its authorization? Justice Ginsburg's
closing remarks indicate that Stolt-Nielsen is a very particular case and narrow
decision which likely does not effectively ban class arbitration in its entirety, and
most likely not even in all clauses that are silent in regards to class arbitration.62
Stolt-Nielsen is a case between two sophisticated companies dealing in a very
particular maritime industry. 63 The Court's rationale considered the parties mutual
business aptitude, and most likely would not reach the same conclusion in cases
dealing with contracts of adhesion between sophisticated companies and individ-
ual consumers.6" In addition, the Court does not ban class arbitration in contracts;
51. Id. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
52. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2011).
53. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
54. Id. at 1776.
55. Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. 539 U.S. at 454; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758 (2010).
61. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
62. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783.
63. See id. at 1758.
64. For an example of a court striking a class action ban in a consumer cases in part because of the
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parties are still able to negotiate class arbitration contract clauses if they choose.
Many may see Stolt-Nielsen as a significant blow to class arbitration,65 but Stolt-
Nielsen merely served to better define when class arbitration is appropriate.
D. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion
The United States Supreme Court released AT&T Mobility, LCC v. Concep-
cion in April 201 1.66 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, ignored the
ethical issues discussed further in this essay and instead focused almost entirely on
the preemption issue between California state law and the FAA. 67 Preemption
issues such as the one in question in Concepcion have occurred numerous times in
the life span of the FAA. 68 However, Concepcion appears to have, at least tempo-
rarily, significantly restricted class arbitration proceedings.69
The Concepcions purchased a cell-phone contract from AT&T.70 The contract
contained an arbitration provision requiring that claims be brought in the party's
"individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class
or representative proceeding."7' The cell-phone contract came with a "free" phone,
but AT&T nonetheless billed the Concepcions for $30.22 in tax for the retail value
of the phone. 72 The Concepcions then brought a class action on behalf of other
similarly situated customers of AT&T.n
The trial court denied AT&T's motion to compel individual arbitration be-
cause it found that AT&T's arbitration agreement was unconscionable under Cali-
fornia law and such law was not preempted by the FAA.74 Following the denied
motion, AT&T filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
from the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. 75
1. Ninth Circuit Opinion76
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the federal district court in that under Califor-
nia law, the arbitration clause contained in the written agreements was uncon-
65. See Link & Bales, Comment, Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements after Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International, PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275 (2011).
66. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
67. Id.
68. Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts must decide cases according to state substantive law and
federal procedural law. Because the FAA was "outcome determinative," the Supreme Court ruled that
the FAA was substantive rather than procedural. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350
U.S. 198 (1956). This was at odds with the understanding of Congress, which had intended the FAA
to be procedural in nature. As a result the Supreme Court eventually ruled that the FAA applied as
substantive law in state as well as federal courts. See Moses H. Cone Mem' Hospital v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (thereby greatly increasing the significance of the FAA's contrac-
tual approach).
69. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
70. Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009).
71. Id. at 852-53.
72. Id. at 852.
73. Id. at 853.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The case name was changed upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court. In the Ninth
Circuit, the case name was under Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009).
No. 2] 315
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scionable and unenforceable. Both courts did so on the basis of the California
Supreme Court's ruling in Discover Bank v. Superior Court7 8 that class-action
waivers are unconscionable under California contract law if, among other things,
bilateral dispute resolution would not substitute for the deterrent effect of a class
action. Following Discover Bank, the Ninth Circuit in Concepcion applied a three-
part test to determine whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is un-
conscionable under California law.79 For such a waiver to be unconscionable, the
test is: (1) whether the contract was a contract of adhesion; (2) whether the dis-
putes between the contracting parties were likely to involve small amounts of
damages; and (3) whether it was alleged that the party with superior bargaining
power had "carried out a scheme deliberately to cheat large numbers of consumers
out of individually small sums of money."so
First, the appellate court found that AT&T's agreement was a contract of ad-
hesion fulfilling the first part of the test because the agreement was a standardized
contract imposed on the subscribing party without an opportunity to negotiate the
terms.8' Second, the appellate court then found that the second part of the test was
fulfilled because the damages for each consumer affected by the tax on the "free"
cell phones would was $30.22, and were thus sufficiently and predictably small
amounts of damages for each consumer which was for the sales tax charged on
cell phones AT&T advertised were "free" constituting predictably small amounts
of damages. 82 Third, the Concepcions alleged in their complaint that "AT&T was
fraudulently advertising the phones were free while knowing AT&T would charge
consumers sales tax on such phones."83 The court found this sufficient to satisfy
the third-prong of the test, rendering the contract unconscionable and unenforce-
able, and affirming the district court's initial holding.84 Because AT&T's contract
fulfilled all the prong of the test, the court found the contract to be unconscion-
able.85
The Court further affirmed the district court's holding that the FAA does not
expressly preempt California law. 86 The FAA provides that arbitration clauses
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."87 The court found because
unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense based on California
law, courts may apply unconscionability to invalidate an arbitration agreement
without contravening the FAA.
77. Id. at 853.
78. 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).
79. Laster, 584 F.3d at 854.
80. Id. at 854-55 (citing Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir.
2007)).




85. Laster, 584 F.3d at 855-57.
86. Id. at 856-57.
87. Id. at 857; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court and held
AT&T's class waiver unenforceable. 89 The court of appeals found the waiver
unconscionable under California law and was therefore unenforceable, and the
FAA neither expressly nor impliedly preempts California law determining uncon-
scionability and enforceability. 90
2. Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of AT&T,9' finding the application of
unconscionability to this case preempted by the FAA. As discussed above, Section
2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Prior
to Concepcion, the Court consistently had interpreted this to mean that arbitration
agreements must be treated the same as other contracts; if state law imposes a
restriction on arbitration agreements but not on other contracts, that restriction is
preempted by the FAA.92
The Discover Bank rule would have been valid under that test, because the
Discover Bank rule forbade unconscionable consumer class-action waivers not
only in arbitration agreements, but in any agreements, whether the agreements
contained an arbitration clause or not regardless of the presence of an arbitration
clause. The majority, however, found that the Discover Bank rule has the effect of
discouraging arbitration by increasing the complexity of the dispute resolution
process and thereby making arbitration less attractive to the AT&Ts of the world.
The problem with this argument, as the dissent points out, is that it is inconsistent
with the text of the statute.93
The majority also found that the requirement of allowing class wide arbitra-
tion "interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and creates a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA." 94 As the dissent correctly pointed out, a precedent
does not exist that suggest proceeding as an individual is a "fundamental attribute
of class actions." A third-and more just-result would have been for the Court to
strike the lopsided arbitration clause in its entirety and allow the case to be liti-
gated as a consumer class action.95
89. Id. at 859.
90. Id.
91. AT&TMobility, LLC., 131 S.Ct. at 1761.
92. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
93. AT&T Mobility, LL.C., 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n. 12 (1967) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1748.
95. The Concepcion case illustrates the unjustness of the rule adopted by the majority. No lawyer in
his or her right mind is going to represent the Concepcions in an individual claim -- whether arbitrated
or litigated-for $30.22. The Concepcions get redress from AT&T, if at all, only through a class
proceeding. The AT&Ts of the world know this, and no doubt are busy drafting class-action-waiver
arbitration clauses. But these are not really "arbitration" clauses, because few of these claims will ever
go to arbitration. These clauses are more accurately described as "liability-waiver clauses", because
they permit large companies to escape liability entirely.
For this reason, there is a good chance that Concepcion - or perhaps even more likely, a later
case applying Concepcion to reach a patently unfair result - will galvanize Congress to amend the
FAA to effectively reverse Concepcion. When Congress does so, that will present a perfect opportu-
nity to amend the FAA to address also the ethical issues presented in this article. Until then, class
No. 2] 317
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III. SELECTING CLASS COUNSEL
In class litigation, the trial judge selects the counsel to represent the class.9 6
Currently, arbitrator(s) select class counsel in arbitration. 97 When arbitrators fill
this role traditionally held by judges, conflicts of interest and partiality occur. 98
Judges must follow strict rules in selecting class counsel." When arbitrators play
that role, issues of bias toward the original counsel in return for selecting the arbi-
trator and for advanced fee payments appear.ioo
A. How the Courts Select Class Counsel
The trial judge, in class-action litigation, selects the counsel that will repre-
sent the class.o'0 The judge must use the standard established in Rule 23 of the
FRCP to select the counsel that is most capable of fully representing the class.102
In 2003, the Supreme Court amended Rule 23 to, among other things, adopt the
completely new subsection (g).1 03 The Supreme Court approved subdivision (g) to
ensure the aptitude of proposed lead class counsel, and to ensure the successful
handling of complex class-action litigation.'10 This addition emphasized the im-
portance of adequate class representation and counsel.'05
Rule 23(g) sets out four factors that a judge must consider when appointing
class counsel:' 0 6 First, "the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating
potential claims in the action;" 07 second, "counsel's experience in handling class
actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action;" 08
third, "counsel's knowledge of the applicable law,"'10 and fourth, "the resources
counsel will commit to representing the class.""l0 Rule 23(g) (2) of the FRCP
states," [w]hen one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may
appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1-4).""'
This rule calls for class counsel to be qualified, have adequate experience, and
possess the necessary resources to conduct the litigation.112 If more than one ade-
arbitration will proceed only in cases in which the arbitration agreement does not expressly limit class
actions and cases in which both parties agree to proceed by class arbitration.
96. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g)(1).
97. See Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
98. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
99. See FED. R. Clv. P. 23.
100. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
101. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g)(2).
102. Id. at 23 (g)(1), (4).
103. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1802.3 (3d ed. 2010).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (g)(1)(A).
107. Id. at 23(g)(1)(A)(i).
108. Id. at 23(g)(1)(A)(ii).
109. Id. at 23(g)(1)(A)(iii).
110. Id. at 23(g)(1)(A)(iv).
Ill. Id. at 23(g)(2).
112. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992).
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quate applicant seeks appointment, the court must appoint the applicant best able
to represent the interests of the class. 113
An example where a court found that the proposed lead counsel was not ade-
quate under Rule 23 is LeBeau v. U.S., a 2004 Federal District of South Dakota
class action case disputing the improper distribution of a prior judgment.114 The
proposed lead class counsel in LeBeau was a solo practitioner without staff assis-
tance. 15 The attorney applied to be the only counsel for the class.' 1 6 The counsel
was to represent a class of nearly 2,000.117 Nothing in the class certification mo-
tion explained how the attorney would be able to handle the work on a large,
complex class action.' There was evidence neither that the attorney had previ-
ously handled class actions, nor that he had any knowledge of class-action law.
The court found that the lead counsel was not equipped to adequately represent
the class without assistance from other counsel.120 Based on Rule 23 and the
courts application of the standard, the courts denied appointment of the proposed
counsel because attorney did not appear qualified and lacked adequate experi-
ence.121 The court then appointed counsel that the court found adequate due to his
many years of complex litigation experience and belonged to a law practice that
was equipped handle the action.122
Another example of where a court grants an application for lead counsel
based on Rule 23 can be found in In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, a
2005 Northern District of California case. 123 In re Rubber Chemicals was a suit
alleging conspiracy to fix the prices of rubber chemicals sold in the United
States.' 24 The district court again used the standard established by Rule 23(g) to
appoint class counsel.125 The court noted the lead counsel's extensive experience
and expertise in antitrust and class action litigation.126 The court also praised the
lead counsel for the extensive research that counsel had conducted as to the eco-
nomic effects of the case and the amount of attorney resources the firm was capa-
ble of dedicating to the action.127 The court ultimately appointed the lead counsel
as class counsel and certified the class.128
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2).




118. LeBeau, 222 F.R.D. at 619.
119. Id. at 613.
120. Id. at 619.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 619.
123. In re Rubber Chem. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
124. Id. at 349.
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B. How Arbitrators Select Class Counsel
The Federal Arbitration Act does not provide guidelines for class arbitration
but the American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides supplementary rules.129
The AAA officially began facilitating class arbitrations by releasing its "Supple-
mentary Rule for Class Arbitrations" on October 3, 2008.130 Except for a short
statement in the AAA's Supplementary Rules, there are no provisions found in the
AAA's rules that govern the selection of class counsel in arbitration.'3 ' As such,
arbitrators face possible ethical challenges in selecting class counsel.132
1. The Selection Process
The AAA maintains a roster of over 8,000 trained neutral arbitrators ("neu-
trals") that serve as arbitrators for all types of conflicts. 133 When the AAA ap-
points an arbitrator, the AAA holds the arbitrator to the AAA's Commercial Arbi-
tration Rules and Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.'34 The
AAA administers class arbitration only if "(1) the underlying agreement specifies
that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall be resolved by arbitration
in accordance with any of the Association's rules, and (2) the agreement is silent
with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims."1 35 Section 4(a)(5)
of the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations established by the AAA states
that "[c]ounsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class."l 36 However, there is no further standard established for the
arbitrator's selection of class counsel.
Unless there is another method in the contracted arbitration clause, the AAA
provides a four-step system for counsel to select an arbitrator.'37 First, the AAA
sends each party a copy of the same prepared list of possible arbitrators.138 Sec-
ond, the guidelines provide the parties 15 days to strike names they object to and
order the remaining possible arbitrators.1 39 Third, after the parties return the lists,
the AAA notes the mutual selections for assignment of an arbitrator.1 40 Fourth, if
the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the AAA will administratively appoint
129. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
130. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15. It should be noted that the AAA's rules do not cover
all arbitrations. The rules and standards established by the AAA apply only to arbitrations where the
parties have agreed to be bounds by the AAA rules. These Supplementary Rules were promulgated in
response to the Green Tree case. See supra § II (b).
131. See id. § 4(a)(5).
132. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30-31.
133. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, A GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION FOR BUSINESS PEOPLE 4
(2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4121.
134. Id. at 19.
135. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, July 14, 2005,
http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy (AAA does not administer class hearings on claims where
the arbitration agreement prohibited class claims). See also Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l
Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009).
136. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 4(a)(5).
137. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 133, at 19-20.
138. Id. at 19.
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one.141 Once the original counsel has selected the arbitrator, the arbitrator then
must certify the class in a fashion similar to the Federal Rules class certification
process for judges.142
The AAA's model arbitration clause for contracts contains no language re-
garding class arbitration.143 In AAA arbitrations, when an arbitrator finds that
class certification is appropriate, meaning neither the type of conflict nor the arbi-
tration clause prohibits class certification, the arbitrator gives a Clause Construc-
tion Award'" and a Class Determination Award 45 to both parties.146 The Class
Determination Award contains the class definition, the class representatives, and
class counsel.147
2. Potential Conflicts
Arbitrators select counsel for the certified class in an arbitration proceed-
ing.148 If counsel participated in the selection of the arbitrator, filed the claim,
and/or advanced fees to the arbitrators, at minimum, this creates the appearance
that an arbitrator would be more likely to choose the original counsel as class
counsel.149 The standard of conduct for arbitrators is not as well defined as for
judges, and the arbitration process itself creates conflicts for arbitrators.'50
a. The Original Class Counsel Chose the Arbitrator(s)
Once the original counsel selects the arbitrator, the arbitrator then must cer-
tify the class counsel in a fashion very similar to Rule 23 for class counsel ap-
pointment for judges.' 5' The process of selecting an arbitrator and the counsel's
initial communication with the arbitrator before rendering class certification create
a familiarity between the arbitrator and the class counsel. This would not only
141. Id.
142. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, §§ 4-5. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(c).
143. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 7
(2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4125. The model arbitration clause reads:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with
its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
144. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 3 ("Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as
a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause,
whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a
class").
145. Id. at § 5 ("The arbitrator's determination concerning whether an arbitration should proceed as a
class arbitration shall be set forth in a reasoned, partial final award").
146. Id. at § § 3, 5.
147. Id. at § 5(b).
148. Id. at § 5.
149. See Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, Building the Civilization of Arbitration: How Congress Can
Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (2009). See also
Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
150. The American Arbitration Association released its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations to
regulate the procedure of class arbitration and conduct of arbitrators during class proceedings. See Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, supra at note 15.
151. Id. H§ 4-5. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(c).
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indicate collegiality between the counsel and arbitrator but also the counsel's par-
tiality toward the counsel who took part in the arbitrator selection process.152
Here is how arbitrator and class counsel selection can play out hypothetically:
Counsel X chose Arbitrator Y for a potential class arbitration proceeding. This
selection may be financially lucrative for Arbitrator Y, especially if the class ac-
tion is complex. Counsel X may also like to have an appointment as class counsel
because the selection is financially lucrative. Counsel X will then apply to Arbi-
trator Y for the financially lucrative appointment as class counsel. If Arbitrator Y
appoints Counsel X as class counsel, the appointment may appear as an unspoken
quid pro quo for the Counsel X's appointment of Arbitrator Y. At the very least,
this arrangement creates a strong appearance of impropriety and may create a
conflict of interest for Arbitrator Y.
The first Canon of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct requires that a judge must act at all times in ways that build public confi-
dence in the impartiality of the judiciary.153 The second Canon in the Model Code
continues that judges must uphold and apply the law as well as perform all duties
of the office "fairly and impartially."'1" Lastly, the second Canon goes on to say
that a judge should not permit financial interests or relationships to influence their
judicial conduct or judgment.1 5 5
Federal law states that a judge or justice at any time his or her impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, he or she must recuse himself or herself. 5 6 If a
judge has a personal bias for or against a party, he or she must disqualify himself
or herself. 5 7 If the standards applied to judges applied to arbitrators, the influence
of the arbitration process on his/her decision in appointing class counsel would
violate the judicial canons.' 5 8 However, arbitrators are not subject to Judicial Can-
ons. Thus, the strong possibility and at minimum the appearance of misconduct is
prevalent in the class arbitration process. The less strict and informal nature of
arbitration expands too far if it causes arbitrators to face unavoidable influ-
ences.159
b. The Original Class Counsel Advanced Payments/Fees to the
Arbitrator(s)
Arbitrators normally charge a consistent fee rate beginning as soon as the par-
ties agree on the arbitrator. 60 The discovery, motions, and class-certification
process mentioned in the examples above are billable hours for the arbitrator,
which the arbitrator will submit in his/her fee statement to class counsel. It is then
up to the parties to each pay their share. The AAA has rules governing the suspen-
152. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
153. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007). The Code defines impartiality as "absence
of bias or prejudice in favor of ... particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an
open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge."
154. Id. at R. 2.2.
155. Id. at R. 2.4.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). See discussion infra Part IV.
157. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006). See discussion infra Part IV.
158. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30-31.
159. Id.
160. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 133, at 19.
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sion of proceedings if the AAA and/or the arbitrator do not receive the fees on
time.' This creates a conflict of interest for the arbitrator because the arbitrator
may show partiality to the original counsel who arranges for these fees to be
paid.162
At times, parties pay fees and make advanced payments to the arbitrator be-
fore commencement of the proceeding, determination of class counsel and certifi-
cation of the class. 63 Counsel seeking class certification and class counsel ap-
pointment has established a working relationship with the selected arbitrator and
forwarded the required advanced fees, thus creating at least the perception of par-
tiality.
The same udicial rules previously mentioned apply equally to the advanced
fees problem.) Judges are to avoid ex parte communications except for circum-
stances such as administrative purposes.' 65 Paying advanced fees to an arbitrator
could be considered an acceptable communication for administrative purposes of
the arbitration proceeding; however now a financial interest presents itself.166
Arbitrators would be hard pressed to deny that such direct and strong financial
interest-already receiving payment from an attorney applying to be class coun-
sel-at least indicates the perception that it might affect her judgment in selecting
class counsel.
To state more clearly, suppose parties selected Arbitrator Y to arbitrate a po-
tential class arbitration claim. Counsel X participated with opposing counsel in the
process of selecting Arbitrator Y and has advanced fees to Arbitrator Y. The next
step is for Arbitrator Y to certify the class and select the counsel to represent the
class. Arbitrator Y may not pick Counsel X, but Arbitrator Y is undeniably famil-
iar with Counsel X. In a perfect world, the Arbitrator Y selects the best-qualified
attorneys as filtered through the test provided by the Federal Rules. However,
unlike a judge, Arbitrator Y has already been selected and paid by Counsel X.
This pushes the conflict of interest even further because the Arbitrator Y may
appoint Counsel X as class counsel because Counsel X has selected and paid Ar-
bitrator Y. If Arbitrator Y does in fact appoint Counsel X as class counsel, this
arrangement creates a strong appearance of impropriety.
161. Am. Arbitration Ass'n., supra note 15, § 11. Section 11 reads:
11. Administrative Fees and Suspension for Nonpayment
(c) If an invoice for arbitrator compensation or administrative charges has not been paid in
full, the AAA may so inform the parties in order that one of them may advance the required
deposit. If such payments are not made, the arbitrator may order the suspension or termina-
tion of the proceedings. If no arbitrator has yet been appointed, the AAA may suspend the
proceedings.
(d) If an arbitration conducted pursuant to these Supplementary Rules is suspended for
nonpayment, a notice that the case has been suspended shall be published on the AAA's
Class Arbitration Docket.
162. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
163. Am. Arbitration Ass'n., supra note 15, § 11.
164. See discussion supra § III (B)(2)(a).
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IV. ALLOCATING FEES AND AWARDS TO CLASS COUNSEL
Final awards by arbitrators carry the binding authority of judicial awards but
are considerably harder to vacate.167 These final awards can include attorney's
fees and costs to class counsel.168 Both the courts and academia have debated the
propriety of an arbitrator giving awards that include his or her fees. 169 In class-
action litigation, judges must play "guardian" of class members and protect their
interests in the suit against collusion by counsel or the represented parties. 70 Arbi-
trators play the same role as judges, but the questions of bias and financial interest
flourish because the parties pay the arbitrators as the hearings progress, and often
the fees and awards that arbitrators give contain the fees that the parties are to pay
back to the arbitrator.17' As financial exchanges between the parties and their um-
pire(s) increase, the perception of impropriety follows suit.
Arbitral and judicial standards are considerably different.172 The impartiality
standards that apply to arbitrators by the federal courts and ethics committees are
greatly relaxed compared to judges.173 28 U.S.C. § 455 states the reasons for
which a judge or justice should disqualify himself from a proceeding:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or per-
sonal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(4) He knows that he, . . . has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;174
These personal biases for a judge and financial interest are grounds for recusal
from hearing cases;' 75 however, there is not an equivalent standard applicable to
167. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Clemente, 272 Fed. App'x. 174 (3d Cir.
2008).
168. See David S. Clancy & Matthew M. K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the
Federal Arbitration Act's Legislative History, 63 Bus. LAW. 55, 73-74 (2007).
169. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, R.
43(d)(ii), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.ask?id=22440#R43 (last visited September 21, 2011).
170. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2006).
171. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 31.
172. Compare 9 U.S.C. §10 (2006) with 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
173. See Steven J. Goering, The Standard of Impartiality As Applied to Arbitrators by Federal Courts
and Codes of Ethics, 3 GEo. J. LEG. ETHics 821 (1990).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2011).
175. See U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) ("The alleged bias and prejudice must stem
from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case."); Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927)
(finding that due process is denied if the judge has "the slightest pecuniary interest" in the case); and
Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976) (A personal bias has been defined as "an attitude
324 [Vol. 2011
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arbitrators.
A. How the Courts Allocate Fees and Awards
FRCP's Rule 23(e) allows for class settlements, voluntary dismissals, or
compromises under certain scenarios and with judicial approval.176 However, in
class action proceedings, the trial judge continually plays "guardian" for the
members of the class not directly represented. 7 7 Rule 23(d)(2) allows judges to
order class representatives to send notice of the proceedings to all members of the
class for their protection and fairness.17 8 Courts also have discretion in determin-
ing and awarding "reasonable" fees in a class action.179
In Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corporation, a Seventh Circuit case, a class of
1.6 million people sued Fleet Mortgage Corporation, which owned the home
mortgages of the plaintiffs. 8 0 Fleet had sold mortgage information such as loan
amounts, types of loans, and repayment histories to third-party telemarketing
companies.181 The class alleged that Fleet violated the Truth-in-Lending Act
(TLA), 18 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,183 and other state consumer protection
laws.184
In 2004, the parties entered into an initial settlement agreement, which pro-
vided for two plaintiff classes: a telemarketing class of approximately 190,000
people and an information-sharing class of around 1.4 million members.'8 1 In the
first settlement, the amount the telemarketing class and the fees for the class law-
yers would receive were substantial,186 but the information sharing class received
nothing.'8 7 Members of the class appealed and the court of appeals agreed, but
toward petitioner that is significantly different from and more particularized than the normal, general
feelings of society at large . . .").
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) states:
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise.
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court's approval.
The following procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compro-
mise:
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who
would be bound by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a
hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under
this subdivision (e); the objections may be withdrawn only with the court's approval.
177. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 748.
178. WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 103, § 1793. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
179. WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 103, § 1803.1.
180. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 746.
181. Id.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667(f) (2006).
183. 15 U.S.C.§ 1681 (2011).
184. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 746.
185. Id. at 746-47.
186. Id. at 747. The telemarketing class would receive $2.4MM and the class attorneys would receive
$750K.
187. Id. at 746-47.
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rather than focusing on the issues of the case, the court closely dissected the ac-
tions of the district court in failing to protect all members of the class.,88
The court stated that judges must be very vigilant "in scrutinizing proposed
settlements of class actions to consider whether the settlement is 'fair, adequate,
and reasonable, and not a product of collusion."' 89 The court also stated that a
trial court should evaluate the probability of plaintiff winning its claims, the pre-
dicted costs of future litigation, and hints of collusion.190 Even under an abuse of
discretion standard, the court of appeals found that the district court committed
reversible error in not determining the potential value of the class' claim to allow
proper evaluation of the reasonableness of the proposed settlement.'91
The Seventh Circuit in Mirfasihi showed how a trial judge should have acted
to protect all members of a class action suit.192 Judges are to protect the rights of
unrepresented members and Rule 23 establishes this standard.193 This consistent
standard offers ensured protection for unrepresented members and in cases that
protection fails, appeals are available.194
B. How Arbitrators Allocate Fees and Awards
These protections that are laid out in Rule 23 for all members of a class in
litigation do not extend into arbitration. 95 The FAA does not contain statutory
protection for unrepresented members of class arbitration.196 However, arbitrators'
final awards, which can include attorney's fees, are binding and hard to vacate.' 97
The AAA requires its "neutrals" to play the guardian role for the class mem-
bers,198 but the counsel pays fees to arbitrators as the claims progress and the arbi-
trators' final awards can contain amounts for his/her own fees.199 This gap in pro-
fessional and ethical standards between arbitrators and judges is most likely a
byproduct of what is sought in arbitration-more informal proceedings, less ex-
pense, less stringent structure.200 However, such informal proceedings require
ethical scrutiny when it comes to class arbitrations and the rights of all parties.20'
1. The Allocation Process
The FAA provides that arbitrators' awards may be vacated "where the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; or where there was evident
188. Id. at 747.
189. Id. at 748 (citing Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F. 3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002)).
190. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 748; see also Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
834 F. 2d 677, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1987).
191. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 751.
192. Id.
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) & (e).
194. See, e.g., Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d 745.
195. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 29-30.
196. See 9 U.S.C.§ 1 (2011).
197. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Clemente, 272 Fed. Appx. 174, 176 (3d Cir.
2008).
198. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 8.
199. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
200. STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 1-2.
201. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 30.
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partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . ."202 "Corruption," "fraud," or "undue
means" and "evident partiality" have been very hard to prove to vacate an arbitra-
tor's award.203
There is no statutory equivalent protection specifically for class members in
arbitration as in the FRCP and Mirfasihi,204 but organizations like the AAA have
codes of ethics for their neutrals. The AAA's rules are generally silent in re-
gards to awarding attorney's fees.206 However, parties may modify their arbitra-
tion clauses and agreements to allow an arbitrator to award attorney's fees.20 The
AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations states, "[t]he arbitrator may
approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise that would bind class
members only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement, voluntary dis-
missal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate." 208 This lack of statutory
protection expected from arbitrators allows the arguments of possible conflicts of
interest to rise when it comes to awards and settlement approval in class arbitra-
tion.209
2. Potential Conflicts
When a judicial class action settles, the trial court judge plays a significant
role in insuring and protecting all the members of the class.2 0 The judge must
ensure that class counsel act as honest fiduciaries for the entire class.2 11 Courts, for
many years, have been aware of the high probability that defendants in class ac-
tions are interested in minimizing the sum of damages paid to the class, and de-
fendants are therefore willing to pay high attorney's fees in exchange for small
damages. 212 There is no statutory rule requiring arbitrators to provide the same
protection for class members, but the AAA has established similar protections to
those in the FRCP for judicial class actions. 213 Given that the arbitrator(s) were (1)
selected by the representative counsel and (2) have been receiving payment for
his/her services since the onset of the class arbitration proceeding, 2 14 questions
arise regarding the arbitrators approval of a settlement and actions as "guardian"
of the class.215 It is the view of some scholars that market forces drive arbitrators
202. 9 U.S.C. § l0(a)(1)-(2) (2011).
203. See, e.g., Clemente, 272 Fed. Appx. 174.
204. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 745.
205. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32124 (last visited April It, 2011).
206. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 37
(2004).
207. Id. The AAA's model arbitration clause for awarding attorney's fees reads, "The prevailing party
shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees."
208. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 8.
209. See Doyle, supra note 6, at 31.
210. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
211. Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 748 (quoting Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.2d 781, 785 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
212. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Thorogood v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2008).
213. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 8.
214. Id. § 11.
215. Id. § 8.
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to act neutrally or "fairly" to both parties. This assumes that both parties are ac-
tively involved in many class arbitrations. However, most consumers and their
counsel are not regularly involved in class arbitration, while businesses may be
perpetually involved in class arbitrations. Therefore, the point is driven further
that arbitrators may be more inclined to prefer the business entity of certain class
arbitrations proceedings, especially consumer-based class arbitrations, with the
goal of perpetuating future business.
a. Conflicts After Having Been Paid by Class Counsel
In arbitrations, the parties directly compensate the arbitrator(s) involved in the
dispute.2 16 Arbitrators normally charge a consistent fee rate and compensation
begins with the first day of the arbitration hearing. 217 This creates a connection to
the parties that independent judges do not face. A judge who had this type of fi-
nancial connection and questionable bias to a party would have to disqualify him-
self under Federal law; 218 however, the arbitration system allows arbitrators to
conduct arbitration hearings with these connections to the parties.219
Section 8 of the AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations requires
that an arbitrator approve any settlement between the parties.220 Counsel for the
class is required to send notice to the class members affected or bound by such a
settlement, dismissal, or compromise.221 However, the reliance on the ethics and
moral impartiality of an arbitrator is not enough to ensure the protection of a class
from collusion of opposing counsels-and especially not opposing counsels and
the arbitrators.222 This raised issue will surely give rise to objections from unrep-
resented class members in accordance with the AAA's rules. Section 8(d) of the
AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations allows any class member to
object to a settlement, dismissal, or compromise.224 However, the arbitrator can
approve the withdrawal of these objections.225
b. Awards of Expenses which Include Arbitrator's Fees
To begin arbitration with the AAA, the demanding party must advance a non-
refundable filing fee.226 The arbitrator can then apportion the fee between the par-
ties.227 Counsels for the parties in arbitrations are normally responsible to pay the
arbitrator(s) fees.228 Arbitrators have stated, in their own opinions, their personal
216. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 133, at 30.
217. Id. at 19.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2011).
219. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 8.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Mirfasihi, 450 F.3d at 748 (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'i Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279
(7th Cir.2002)).
223. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, supra note 15, § 8.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 133, at 18.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 30.
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conflict of interest regarding award determinations and their fees in class arbitra-
tion.22
Arbitrators often face questions in the claim that might affect their fee and
230therefore their award. Such factors that can affect their fee as well as the final
award include, for example, the ethics and professionalism of the arbitrators them-
selves.231 Conflicts also arise because arbitrators are also interested in promulgat-
ing business, which creates financial incentives of the arbitrators and the arbitra-
tion forums to appear unbiased in order to attract this continued business.232 The
appearance of conflicts of interest where an arbitrator makes an award, which the
parties will use to pay her or him, is not faced by judges in class litigation.233
If Arbitrator Z finds for party X and awards a dollar amount from opposing
party Y, that monetary award will likely include Arbitrator Z's fee. Therefore, in
determining the award, Arbitrator Z must also determine her or his compensation.
Arbitrator Z cannot ethically undertake determining a dollar amount to award
class X from company Y that includes the amount he will be paid. It is also likely
if company Y is a big corporation that has used Arbitrator Z multiple times in the
past that Arbitrator Z would like to continue this working relationship. Arbitrator
Z is unable to overcome this ethical conundrum of finding for and determining an
award for class X while desiring to maintain a working relationship with company
Y.
3. Judicial Certification
In such instances where class arbitration settles, judicial certification is a pos-
sibility to aid arbitrators in avoiding such conflicts. 234 However, this proposition
raises more issues than viable answers. If there is a judicial certification, the par-
ties' agreement to decide their suit in arbitration is lost. 2 If there was no pending
case, and the parties from the onset agreed to arbitration, the court has no jurisdic-
tion to issue such a certification.236
For example, if X is a class of residents that is engaged in class arbitration as
required by their service contract with local cable provider Y for overcharging its
customers, "X v. Y" would not exist on any docket in any court system. If Y
makes an offer that the class of X accepts, there is no opportunity or means for
judicial certification/oversight of such an agreement to ensure that the arbitrators
were not exposed to the conflicts mentioned above. When there is no jurisdiction;
229. Hobby v. Snap-on Tools Co. LLC, AAA No. 111140188404, at 12 n. 5 (2005) (Matthews, Arb.),
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3695.
230. David S. Clancy & Matthew M. K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal
Arbitration Act's Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW 55, 73 (2007).
231. Thomas Burch, Necessity Never Made A Good Bargain: When Consumer Arbitration Agree-
ments Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1034 (2004). "[A]rbitrators may have a
financial incentive to certify a class because the longer the arbitrator spends on the case the more
money the arbitrator receives," but stating that "arbitration institutions, and arbitrators as well, have
incredibly strong financial incentives to avoid any appearance of bias."
232. Id.
233. Clancy & Stein, supra note 230, at 73-74.
234. STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 508.
235. Id.
236. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
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there is no case. Even if there was a case filed, this possible bouncing back and
forth between judicial and arbitral proceedings could destroy the economic and
durational attractiveness of arbitration. 237
V. POSSIBLE ADDITIONS AND REVISIONS TO THE FAA
It is unlikely that Congress envisioned class arbitration in 1925 when it
passed the FAA. If Congress amends the FAA in reaction to Concepcion to allow
class arbitration, it also has the opportunity to alleviate some of these unavoidable
ethical issues for arbitrators. However, the more regulations Congress places on
class arbitrations, the less viable the option becomes. Amendments must therefore
be made while being cognizant of what renders class arbitration beneficial. Con-
gress might develop an entirely new section of the FAA focused exclusively on
class arbitration. Congress could then systematically approach all of the issues in
class arbitration. However, absent a dedicated section to class arbitration in the
FAA, Congress could also alleviate the ethical issues by amending a few of the
current sections.
A. Counsel Selection
The Section 5 of the FAA authorizes a court to appoint an arbitrator or arbi-
trators if the parties' agreement does not contain an arbitrator-selection process
and if the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator.238 Congress should amend Section
5 to require judicial appointment/certification arbitrators in class arbitrations. This
would alleviate the arbitrator's ethical issue regarding appointing class counsel
after competing counsel selected and paid advanced fees to the arbitrator.
Section 5 currently contains one paragraph prescribing how a federal court
shall designate an arbitrator to preside over the controversy if the parties' agree-
ment does not provide for a method of choosing an arbitrator and the parties can-
not reach an agreement. 239 Congress should re-label this paragraph as subsection
(a), and then add a subsection (b) stating that parties to class arbitrations must file,
in a court that would have had jurisdiction over the underlying controversy, a
petition for the selection of arbitrator(s) who will preside over the controversy.
This section should further state that upon judicial selection of the arbitrator, the
court then would stay the "proceeding" in accordance with Section 3 of the FAA,
until a party brings the issue back before the court for certification of the award in
accordance with the proposed revisions suggested below.240
B. Award Certification
Section 9 of the FAA describes how a party may obtain a court order con-
firming the arbitrator's award if the arbitration agreement calls for such an or-
237. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 69
(2007).
238. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2011).
239. Id.
240. See id. at § 3 (2011).
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der.24 1 Congress should re-label the existing language as subsection (a), and add a
subsection (b) that would provide that class-action arbitration awards and settle-
ments are not enforceable until confirmed by a court that would have had jurisdic-
tion over the underlying controversy, and that would permit any party to obtain
this confirmation by petitioning the court to lift the stay that was ordered follow-
ing the judicial selection of the arbitrator pursuant to the amended Section 5. Con-
gress should add a subsection (c) to import the Rule 23 protections for absent class
members, by requiring close judicial scrutiny of class action arbitration awards
and settlements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The inherent ethical issues surrounding class arbitrations will not disappear
on their own. Congress could and should consider possibilities to most adequately
subdue the ethical problems in class arbitration proceedings. These simple pro-
posed additions and revisions to the FAA would allow courts more oversight in
order to protect the rights of parties and the respect of the system.
Class arbitration grew increasingly prevalent, particularly in consumer claims
prior to Concepcion.242 Without regulation, however, it significantly compromises
arbitrator neutrality, both in the arbitrator-selection process and in the process of
issuing arbitration awards or approving settlements. If Congress amends the FAA
to allow class arbitration, it should to permit limited judicial supervision of these
processes. Doing so will allow Congress to eliminate the conflicts of interest
while retaining the benefits of class arbitration.
241. See id. at § 9 (2011).
242. The AAA currently has 301 Class Arbitration Proceedings active as of April II, 2011. See
Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562
(last visited Apr. I1, 2011).
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